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Abstract
We analyze how political candidates can signal their competence and show that
polarization might be a way of doing this. For this purpose, we study a unidimensional
Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition in which a fraction of candidates have
the ability to correctly observe a policy-relevant state of the world. We show that candi-
dates tend to polarize, even in the absence of policy bias. This is because proposing an
extreme platform has a competence signaling e¤ect and has a strictly higher probability
of winning than proposing a median platform. The degree of polarization depends on
how uncertain is the state of the world.
1 Introduction
In political statements, policy proposals and assessment of the policy-relevant situation are
packaged. Politicians need to demonstrate that they have better knowledge about the sit-
uation than others and that their policy proposals adequately reect such knowledge. For
example, justifying monetary easing measures necessitates convincing the electorate that the
easing is based on an accurate understanding of the source of a recession. Similarly, the use
of military force may be justied only by convincing the electorate of the high chance of the
targeting country holding weapons of mass destruction. This paper shows that polarization
can be a way to signal the politicians better knowledge about the policy-relevant situation
and his or her ability to propose an adequate policy, and that in elections extreme candidates
actually tend to win more often.
Towards this end, this paper incorporates a dimension of politicianscompetencewithin
a standard electoral competition model. Our view of competence follows that of Stokes
(1963). According to Stokes, the role of politicians includes identifying the electorates con-
cerns and trying to convey the message that their policy proposals e¤ectively address those
concerns. This perception denes a dimension of politicianscompetence in our model: the
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ability to discover the most e¤ective policies, under di¤erent circumstances. Under the as-
sumption that only a portion of political candidates possess competence, the electorate tries
to choose a competent person as their leader. This makes it necessary for the electoral
candidates to appear competent and to reveal their competence to the electorate.
Our results show that proposing an extreme platform serves as a signal of competence
and gives candidates a strictly higher probability of winning in comparison to proposing a
median platform. This induces candidates to polarize, even in the absence of bias in policy
preferences. This result stems from the fact that an extreme platform is a risky gamble for
incompetent candidates,1 which means proposing an extreme platform signals competence.
Because of the signaling nature of our model, however, perfect separation of competent and
incompetent candidates is not possible when the candidates care very much about winning
the election; in order to make incompetent candidates choose extreme platforms, they must
have a strictly higher probability of winning than they would have chosen the moderate
platform.
We model electoral competition by adding a state space, which represents the policy-
relevant situation, to a standard Hotelling-Downs one-dimensional policy location game. We
focus solely on the e¤ect on the competencedimension and abstract from heterogeneity
of policy preferences across candidates and voters. The bliss policy depends on the realized
state of the world and is probabilistic in nature. The probability distribution over states is
such that the optimal policy, from an ex-ante point-of-view, is the median policy. Ex-post,
however, the optimal policy is determined by the realized state of the world and can be
di¤erent from the median policy. Competent candidates can observe the state of the world
before the election and, hence, they are aware of the ex-post optimal policy. This implies
that competent candidatesstrategies can be state-dependent, from which the electorate can
deduce information about the true state of the world.
We characterize two di¤erent classes of equilibria. We rst characterize the equilibrium
in which competent candidates polarize more than do incompetent candidates. Because
incompetent candidates are not informed of the state of the world and are risk averse, they
avoid choosing an extreme policy. We also characterize the equilibrium in which incompetent
candidates polarize more than do competent candidates. This equilibrium is interpreted as
competent candidates implicitly coordinating amongst themselves to choose the ex-post best
policy, by using information about the state. This is not possible for incompetent candidates,
who have no clue about the opponents choice. Then they try to polarize, in order to take
advantage of the extreme platformscompetence signaling e¤ect. The main insight of the
paper, that proposing an extreme policy is advantageous for winning the election, holds in
both types of equilibria.
The types of equilibria supported under di¤erent parameter specications show a link
between polarization and uncertainty. The behavior of candidates depends on how uncertain
is the state of the world. Generally, the more uncertain the state of the world, the more
political candidates polarize, which may yield a possible interpretation about what has been
observed in practice; examples may include privatization in Thatcherite Britain in the wake
of the Winter of Discontent, or polarization in Germany back in the time of the Great
Depression, when there appeared political parties both the extreme left and the extreme
1This e¤ect is also examined by Majumdar and Mukand (2004), although they are not dealing with an
electoral competition game.
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right.
The basic setup of our model is based on Kartik and McAfee (2007). In their model, a
fraction of candidates have character, which is unobserved by voters at the time of the
election. Our model di¤ers from their model in not treating competence as an attribute that
voters intrinsically prefer. While in their model whether a candidate has a character or not
enters directly in the voters payo¤ function, in our model the electorate cares only about
what policy is implemented. This necessitates a very di¤erent construction of equilibrium
from their model, which induces the result that each platform has a di¤erent probability of
winning, in contrast to Kartik and McAfee (2007).
Our paper is related to two main strands of the literature. The rst strand is the litera-
ture on career concerns, in which the decisions chosen reect decision makerscompetence.
Prendergast and Stole (1996) build a model in which a manager makes investment decisions
over time, and show that the manager has an incentive to exaggerate his own information in
order to appear to be a fast learner. While in their study competence is characterized by a
variance of noise in information acquisition, we study competence as a binary variable that
renders it possible for candidates to acquire a perfect signal about the state of the world.
Majumdar and Mukand (2004) develop a dynamic model of policy choice in which competent
politicians, who may have the ability to observe the policy-relevant state, care about future
electoral prospects. They point out the possibility of ine¢ cient persistence of previously
enacted policies, since changing policies signals that a politician does not have the ability to
observe the state.
The second strand of literature deals with political competition models in which political
candidates possess private information. Schultz (1996) analyzes an election model in which
ideologically biased candidates are informed about the policy-relevant state. He nds the
relation between the degree to which candidates reveal their private information and their
biases in policy preferences. Martinelli (2001) analyzes a model in which voters also have
private information about the policy-relevant state and shows that the equilibrium does not
result in policy convergence. Heidhues and Lagerlof (2003) show that the candidates have
strong incentives to bias their platform choices toward the electorates prior beliefs, while,
on the contrary, Kartik, Squintani, and Tinn (2012) show that candidates have an incentive
to exaggerate their private information.2
Broadly, this study is one variation of the traditional electoral competition model (Downs,
1957 and Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook, 1970). Most such models in the literature deal with
the case in which the candidates are concerned solely with winning the election. In this study,
we assume that candidates are also policy motivated in the usual sense of the term (Calvert,
1985 and Wittman, 1977), and that the degree of o¢ ce motivation of candidates is known to
the voter.3 For a recent study of such a hybrid preference model, see, for example, Saporiti
(2010).
In tying to incorporate the competence or valence of candidates into Downsian election
models, this paper is also related to Aragones and Palfrey (2001) and Hummel (2010). They
study electoral models in which one candidate enjoys an advantage in the sense that when his
2See also Jensen (2009), Laslier and Straeten (2004), and Loertscher (2012), for more on this strand of
literature.
3Callander (2008) develops a simple model of electoral competitions in which candidates may be either
o¢ ce or policy motivated.
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opponent candidate chooses the same platform, the electorate votes for him.4 Our perception
of competence di¤ers from theirs in that the voters do not intrinsically prefer a competent
over an incompetent candidate as long as the candidate implements the optimal policy. In our
model, the preference over competence is generated endogenously by the fact that competent
candidates tend to choose appropriate policies.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic structure of the model.
In Section 3, we characterize important equilibria of our game. We also discuss renement
issues in this section. Section 4 concludes. Formal proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 The Model
The basic element of the model is a standard Hotelling-Downs unidimensional policy location
game augmented by an uncertain state of the world. There is a one-dimensional policy space
X = f 1; 0; 1g; and a set of states of the world,  = f 1; 0; 1g:5 There is a probability mass
function over states f : ! [0; 1]; that satises
f (0) = m 2 (0; 1) and f ( 1) = f (1) = (1 m) =2;
where m represents the degree of uncertainty about the state of the world. Elements of
X and  are denoted by x and ; respectively. There is a representative voter who has
a policy preference dened on the product of X and :6 Specically, we assume that the
voters utility u (x; ) takes the quadratic loss form u (x; ) =   (x  )2 ; which implies
that the voter wants the implemented policy and the state of the world to be as close to
each other as possible.7 It follows immediately that policy 0 maximizes the voters expected
utility, E[u (x; )]: Hereafter, we call platform 0 the median platform, and 1 and  1 extreme
platforms.
There are two candidates, A and B. We introduce competence of candidates as a binary
variable: candidate i 2 fA;Bg either possesses competence (ci = C) or does not (ci =
I): This is private information and is drawn independently from a Bernoulli distribution
with Pr (ci = C) = c > 0: Before choosing his platform, a competent candidate observes the
state of the world, ; whereas an incompetent candidate does not.8
Our election game proceeds as follows. First, Nature chooses the types of the two candi-
dates, determining whether they are competent or not, and this becomes private information.
Second, Nature draws a state  and competent candidates observe this. Then, the two candi-
dates simultaneously choose their platforms. Since a competent candidate observes the state
of the world, his platform choice can be state-dependent, while an incompetent candidates
4Also, Ashworth and Mesquita (2009) study a game in which candidates invest in costly valences after
choosing platforms.
5We discuss the choice of this discrete model setting in the conclusion.
6Alternatively, we can think that there are multiple voters and each voter is characterized by her preference
parameter, b; and her preference over policy is represented as   (x     b)2 : The preference parameter of
the median voter is 0:
7One way to understand this setting is to interpret x as a level of a governments scal spending and  as
a state of its economy. The peoples preference about the level of scal spending swings with the state of the
economy.
8Majumdar and Mukand (2004) dene a high ability politician and a low ability politician in a similar
way.
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platform choice cannot be state-dependent. After observing the two candidatesplatforms,
the voter votes sincerely to maximize her expected utility, without knowing the true state
of the world and without herself receiving any signal. After the election, the two candidates
receive the same payo¤ from the chosen policy as does the voter. In addition to the payo¤
from the policy, the winning candidate obtains an o¢ ce rent, k 2 (2;1):9 The value of
k measures the degree to which a candidate is motivated by being elected regardless of his
policy (i.e., the degree of o¢ ce motivation). The value of k is common knowledge and is
the same for all candidates.10
Since incompetent candidates do not observe the state of the world, their strategies are
state-independent. Allowing for the possibility of mixed strategies, a strategy for an in-
competent candidate i 2 fA;Bg is represented by a probability mass function gi : X !
[0; 1]:11 In contrast, since competent candidates observe the state, their strategies can be
state-dependent. A strategy for a competent candidate i 2 fA;Bg when the state of the
world is  is represented by a probability mass function gi : X ! [0; 1]:
Since the voter does not observe the state, she has to decide which candidate to vote
for based only on the candidatesplatforms. Her voting strategy is described by a voting
function v : X X ! [0; 1]; which measures the probability of voting for Candidate A:
Given Candidate Bs strategy and the voters voting strategy, Candidate As expected
payo¤ from choosing platform xA when he is competent, observing the state of  is written
asX
xB2X
fv(xA; xB)(k+u  xA; )+ 1  v(xA; xB))u  xB; g(cgB  xB+(1  c) gB  xB); (1)
which we denote by UA
 
xA; 

: Candidate As expected payo¤ when he is incompetent is
E[UA
 
xA; 

] =
X
2
UA
 
xA; 

f () : (2)
Candidate Bs expected payo¤ can be described in an analogous manner.
As this is a signaling game, the voters beliefs about the state of the world are critical. Let
'
 jxA; xB :  ! [0; 1] be the posterior probability mass over the states given Candidate
As and Candidate Bs platforms xA and xB; respectively. Given the posterior belief over the
states, '; the voter votes for Candidate A ifxA  X
2
'
 
jxA; xB <
xB  X
2
'
 
jxA; xB ; (3)
and votes for Candidate B if the opposite inequality holds.12 Any voting rule is optimal when
those two terms in (3) are equal.
9It can be shown that when k  2 is very low, we can support an equilibrium such that all types of
candidates simply choose the best platform given their information, and the voter simply votes for a candidate
proposing an extreme platform because she knows that the candidate is proposing the most appropriate policy.
10In benchmark Hotelling-Downs models of electoral competition, candidates are purely o¢ ce motivated,
i.e., k =1:
11As in Kartik and McAfee (2007), we take the interpretation of mixed strategies according to the Bayesian
view of opponentsconjectures, originating in Harsanyi (1973). That is, a candidates mixed strategy need
not represent him literally randomizing over platforms; instead, it represents the uncertainty that the other
candidate and the electorate have about his pure strategy choice.
12This follows from the form of the voters utility function.
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Our solution concept is that of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991).
This requires that the platform distributions, gA; gB; gA and g
B
 , maximize the expected
payo¤of each candidate given voter beliefs ': They also need to be consistent with Bayesrule.
Therefore, competent candidates maximize (1), whereas incompetent candidates maximize
(2).
In order to simplify the analysis, we focus on the equilibrium that satises the following
two conditions: 1. Anonymity gA = gB; gA = g
B
 for all , and v (x; y) = 1  v (y; x) for all
x; y 2 X: 2. Symmetry: g ( 1) = g (1) and v ( 1; 1) = 1
2
: Anonymity implies that two candi-
dates choose the same strategy and the voting rule treats the two candidates equally. Sym-
metry implies that the two extreme platforms are treated in the same way. From anonymity,
we drop the superscript on candidate strategies.
In an equilibrium, the voters belief when she observes (xA; xB) takes the form
'
 
jxA; xB = f ()  xA; xB; P
 f () (x
A; xB; )
; (4)
where

 
xA; xB; 

= c2g(x
A)g(x
B)
+c (1  c) [g(xA)g(xB) + g(xA)g(xB)] + (1  c)2 g(xA)g(xB);
which is the probability that a particular pair of platforms (xA; xB) is chosen, conditional on
the realization of the state. We impose no restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
Given an equilibrium (g; g; v; '), the (ex-ante) probability of winning associated with
platform x before observing the state, which is denoted by W (x) ; is
W (x) = c  E
"X
y2X
g (y) v (x; y)
#
+ (1  c)
X
y2X
g (y) v (x; y) :
This follows because with probability c; the opponent is competent and uses the state-
contingent strategy g (y), while with probability 1   c the opponent is incompetent and
uses the non-state-contingent strategy g (y) :
In what follows, we let T = fI; (C; 1); (C; 0); (C; 1)g be the type space of candidates,
where I 2 T corresponds to an incompetent type, and (C; ) 2 T corresponds to the type of
a competent candidate observing the state :
3 Signaling Competence
In this section, we characterize the set of equilibria that satisfy certain conditions. Those
equilibria share some important properties, and it is useful to rst summarize these in a
proposition.
Proposition 1 In an equilibrium that satises anonymity and symmetricity and passes the
D1 criterion (dened in Appendix B), the following hold:
Fact 1: The probability of winning associated with proposing an extreme platform is
strictly higher than that from proposing the median platform. That is,
W ( 1) = W (1) > W (0) :
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Fact 2: Competent candidates who observe an extreme state choose the corresponding
platform. That is
g 1 ( 1) = g1 (1) = 1:
It might be useful to explicitly dene the usage of the term polarization in our analysis.
Fact 2 says that competent candidates observing an extreme state simply choose the (ex-post)
optimal platform that matches the true state. Because such a platform actually maximizes the
voters utility given the state, we do not call such behavior of candidates polarization. We
say that a candidate is polarizing when he is choosing a platform 1 or 1; although the median
platform is most preferred according to his available information. This implies that the word
is used only for the behavior of incompetent candidates and competent candidates observing
that the true state is the median. Furthermore, we say that a candidate is completely
polarizing if he never chooses the median and mildly polarizing when he does not put the
whole mass on choosing the median.
Fact 2 implies that the probability that a candidate proposing an extreme platform is
competent is higher than the probability that he is incompetent. This makes the voter
willing to vote for an extreme, which thereby makes it possible to support Fact 1, which in
turn supports the behavior of competent candidates as described in Fact 2.
3.1 Polarizing Competence
We rst characterize an equilibrium in which competent candidates polarize more than do
incompetent candidates. Although the equilibrium varies continuously with respect to para-
meter changes, for expositional purposes we divide cases into two; one in which the median
state is likely to be realized and one in which it is not likely to be realized. In the former
case, the equilibrium involves mild polarization by competent candidates and moderation by
incompetent ones.
Theorem 1 There is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium that satises the following three condi-
tions:
1-Competent candidates mildly polarize. That is,
g0 (0) 2 (0; 1); g0 ( 1) = g0 (1) > 0; and g 1 ( 1) = g1 (1) = 1:
2-Incompetent candidates choose the median platform. That is,
g (0) = 1:
3-The voting strategy satises
v ( 1; 0) = v (1; 0) > 1
2
and v ( 1; 1) = 1
2
;
if and only if either m > 1=2 or c >  (m) ; where  is a function of m such that  (m) >
1=2 for all m.
The proof is in the Appendix. In this equilibrium, competent candidates observing the
median state ((C; 0)-candidates) mix between the three platforms and thereby mildlypo-
larize. Incompetent candidates choose the moderate policy for certain. On the other hand,
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the voter is indi¤erent between the two candidates, the one who is proposing an extreme and
the other who is proposing the median and she mixes between voting for the two.13 These
require that the way the voter mixes makes (C; 0)-candidates indi¤erent between proposing
the two platforms, and hence the voter attaches a higher winning probability to the extremes,
and that the way (C; 0)-candidates mix strategies on policy announcements makes the voter
indi¤erent between candidates.
To see this point, keeping the other types strategies xed as stated in the theorem,
suppose that (C; 0)-candidatesstrategy puts a very small probability on choosing an extreme
platform, say platform 1. Then, choosing the platform works as a very strong signal that the
candidate is of type (C; 1) and that the state is 1. Hence, it makes the voter vote for him. On
the other hand, if (C; 0)-candidates choose an extreme platform with high probability, that
platform loses signaling power and hence the voter prefers to vote for the median if another
candidate chooses it. Only with an adequate degree of mixing can the expected value of the
state after observing a platform pair of 0 and 1 become exactly 1/2 (
P
2 ' (j1; 0) = 1=2),
and this makes the voter remains indi¤erent between voting for the candidate proposing the
extreme platform and the candidate proposing the median platform. On the other hand, to
make (C; 0)-candidates indi¤erent between the median and the extremes, the probability of
winning associated with extreme platforms must be larger than the probability of winning
associated with the median platform, otherwise extreme platforms attain lower policy utility
than the median platform for (C; 0)-candidates.
This equilibrium is supported only when the median state is likely or when the probability
of competence is su¢ ciently high. The equilibrium requires that the voter is indi¤erent
between the median platform and an extreme platform, and hence the expected value of the
state is exactly in the middle. When m is high, or the state is likely to be the median, mixing
by type (C; 0); is enough to generate indi¤erence and thus we can support the equilibrium.
If m is small, the expected value of the state remains too far from the median, even if type
(C; 0) candidates completely polarize the equilibrium cannot be supported. On the other
hand, even if m is small, if most candidates are competent, so that c is close to one, given a
pair of a moderate and an extreme platform, the voter attaches high probability to the event
that both are competent. Consequently, it is possible to generate the indi¤erence only by
(C; 0)-candidatesmixing.
Roughly speaking, when the median state is likely, ceteris paribus, proposing an extreme
platform is not very credible. By making only competent candidates polarize can we sustain
an adequate degree of credibility of the extreme platform so that the voter is indi¤erent
between the median platform and the extreme platform. Also, even if the median state is
unlikely, if c is very high, incompetent candidates strategies do not matter much for the
voters belief formation, and hence type (C; 0) candidates strategies can fully control the
degree of credibility of extreme platforms.
13Kartik and McAfee (2007)s model also shares this property. In their model, this property and the
assumption that voters ip a fair coin when there is a tie induces an ex-post equilibrium, in which the
same behavior of candidates remains an equilibrium, regardless of whether one candidate announces rst
or second, or both announce simultaneously. The equilibrium in our model, however, is not an ex-post
equilibrium, since the voter is more likely to vote for an extreme platform. This implies that an extreme
platform is more preferred when the opponent chooses an extreme and vice versa.
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We now turn to the case in which extreme states are likely to occur. The following theorem
shows that if the probability of competence is not too high, there is an equilibrium such that
competent candidates completely polarize while incompetent candidates mix between all
platforms.
Theorem 2 There is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium that satises the following three condi-
tions:
1-Competent candidates completely polarize. That is,
g0 (0) = 0 and g 1 ( 1) = g1 (1) = 1:
2-Incompetent candidates mildly polarize. That is,
g (0) 2 (0; 1) and g ( 1) = g (1) :
3-The voting strategy satises
v ( 1; 0) = v (1; 0) > 1
2
and v ( 1; 1) = 1
2
;
if and only if m < 1=2 and c < 1
2(1 m) :
Now the way the voter mixes strategies makes incompetent candidates indi¤erent between
all platforms, while in the equilibrium of Theorem 1 it makes (C; 0)-candidates indi¤erent.
The way incompetent candidates mix makes the voter indi¤erent between candidates for all
combination of platform choices. As in Theorem 1 the fact that a type of candidate whose
optimal policy is the median platform (incompetent candidates) is indi¤erent between the
median platform and extreme platforms means that extreme platforms have higher probabil-
ity of winning than the median.
The equilibria characterized in Theorem 2, however, cannot be supported when the com-
petence probability is very high. This is because in such a case, even when incompetent
candidates put a high probability on choosing extremes, the voter still strictly prefers to vote
for an extreme platform because the median state is su¢ ciently unlikely. Roughly speak-
ing, when the median state is unlikely and candidates are unlikely to be competence, ceteris
paribus, proposing an extreme platform is too credible, which makes the voter always vote
for an extreme. Hence the equilibria cannot be supported when the competence probability
is very high, i.e., c  1
2(1 m) :
The next question is what type of Polarizing Competenceequilibrium we have when
m is small and c is higher than 1
2(1 m) . We see that the equilibrium characterized in the next
theorem is compelling, although it contains an o¤-equilibrium platform choice, and it can be
supported as an equilibrium for all parameter values. Actually, if we do comparative statics
on the equilibrium of Theorem 2, we have lim c" 1
2(1 m)
g (0) = 0 and hence it converges to the
equilibrium characterized in the next theorem.
Theorem 3 For all parameter values, there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium such that
1-Competent candidates completely polarize. That is,
g 1 ( 1) = g1 (1) = 1; and g0 (0) = 0:
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2-Incompetent candidates completely polarize. That is,
g ( 1) = g (1) = 1
2
:
3-The voting strategy satises v (1; 1) = 1
2
:
In this equilibrium, the probability of winning associated with the median platform is
su¢ ciently low so that no candidate chooses it. This is possible by making the voter who
faces one candidate who chooses the median and another who chooses an extreme prefer the
extreme candidate by making her o¤-equilibrium beliefs extreme.14
Although the existence of the equilibrium in Theorem 3 is ensured for all parameter
specications, a simple intuition, however, tells us that it is plausible only when the median
state is unlikely and candidates are very likely to be competent. To see this, suppose that the
voter uses the simple (out-of-equilibrium) updating rule where after a candidate deviates to
the median, she updates her belief about the state based only on the platform choice made
by the non-deviating candidate. Then it can be shown that we need c  1=2 (1 m) to make
the voter want to vote for a non-deviating candidate.15 In this sense, we may say that the
equilibrium is plausible only when candidates are likely to be competent (high c) and the
median state is less likely to be realized (low m). We provide a more formal argument on
this point in Appendix B.
3.2 Polarizing Incompetence
In the equilibria presented so far, competent candidates observing the median state had
stronger incentives to polarize than incompetent candidates. This was because candidates
have risk-averse preference over policies, and hence, for incompetent candidates, choosing
an extreme platform is very risky, which prevented incompetent candidates from polarizing
relative to competent candidates. The next theorem, however, demonstrates that there is an
equilibrium in which only incompetent candidates polarize.
Theorem 4 For all parameter values, there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium that satises
the three conditions:
1-Competent candidates choose the (ex-post) best platform. That is,
g0 (0) = 1 and g 1 ( 1) = g1 (1) = 1:
2-Incompetent candidates mildly polarize. That is,
g (0) 2 (0; 1) and g ( 1) = g (1) > 0:
3-The voting strategy satises
v ( 1; 0) = v (1; 0) > 1
2
and v ( 1; 1) = 1
2
:
14We are free to attach any belief, from the denition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
15To see this, observe that if the non-deviating candidate is choosing 1 and the voter updates her belief
based only on it, the voter attaches probability (1 m)  c+ 1 c2  ; m; (1 m)   1 c2  to the state being 1,
0, and  1; respectively. This implies that the expected value of the state is (1 m) c:
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The key to understanding how this equilibrium is supported is the fact that di¤erent
types of candidates face di¤erent lotteries over the opponents choice. In the equilibrium, a
type-(C; 0) candidate thinks that the opponent is very likely to choose the median, because
c is high. Hence, for him, the median platform is not too disadvantageous in terms of winning
the election. On the other hand, an incompetent candidate knows that the opponent is likely
to choose an extreme, because of the high c and the small m. Given that extreme platforms
have higher winning probabilities, this means that the (interim) probability of winning that
incompetent candidates can expect from choosing the median platform is small. This induces
them to polarize, while keeping type-(C; 0) candidates choosing the median. Intuitively, a
high probability of competence enables type-(C; 0) candidates to implicitly coordinate their
strategy to choose the ex-post best policy.
Note that in this equilibrium it can happen that proposing an extreme platform hurts the
voters belief about the candidates competence. Because the voter is su¢ ciently condent
that an extreme state occurs and candidates are competent, she has a very strong incentive to
vote for an extreme. In order to make her indi¤erent between candidates choosing an extreme
platform and the median platform, incompetent candidates must have a high probability of
choosing the extreme platform, thereby reducing its competence signaling e¤ect.
Although the model has multiple equilibria, there are some relationships between strate-
gies and parameter values that all the equilibria, except for the one in Theorem 3 in which
candidatesstrategies are invariant with parameters, characterized in this section share and
it is worth mentioning them briey. First, in each equilibrium, there is a positive relationship
between the probability of winning associated with the median platform and the probability
of competence. This is because, for a candidate, it implies that the opponent is more likely to
choose an extreme platform. This e¤ect decreases the probability of winning associated with
the median platform, which must be o¤set by increasing the odds that the median platform
wins over extremes. Also, there are positive relationships between the degree of o¢ ce mo-
tivation and the probility of winning assiciated with the median platform. The intuition is
that when a policy becomes less important relative to the importance of winning the election,
candidates are not willing to choose the median platform unless it has good odds of winning
over extremes.
Our model, which is essentially a signaling game, allows multiple equilibria. A source of
multiplicity comes from its large strategy space for players, and another source of multiplic-
ity comes from the freedom of o¤-equilibrium specication of beliefs, which is common in
signaling games. As long as we restrict attention to a particular class of equilibria, however,
we have full characterization of equilibria in the class. In Appendix B, we provide an equi-
librium renement criterion D1, appropriately modied to t to our model. Then we can
actually eliminate the equilibrium such that one of the extreme platforms is never chosen
on-equilibrium. The intuition is simple: the type of candidate who has the strongest incen-
tive to deviate to an extreme platform is the competent type who observes the corresponding
extreme state, which induces the voter to vote for the deviating candidate. This enables us
to have the following result:
Theorem 5 Any anonymous and symmetric equilibrium that passes the D1 criterion is one
of those characterized in Theorems 1 to 4.
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4 Conclusion
This paper examined a signaling game in which a fraction of the candidates are competent,
but competence is unobservable by voters. The general insight is that being extreme is
advantageous for winning the election, because it makes the candidate who is so appear
competent.
An important assumption of our model is that candidates are assumed to commit to
policies during the election, and the commitment is assumed to be credible. Some justication
for this assumption can be made. For example, real-life implementation of a policy requires
preparations and there is a lag between proposing a policy and actually implementing it.
This makes it impossible to change policies exibly. In our model, if the commitment is not
credible,16 the representative voter knows that, after the election, competent candidates will
implement the optimal policy contingent on the revealed state of the world and incompetent
candidates will implement the median policy. Then all the platforms that are announced in
equilibrium have the same winning probability.
In this paper, in order to focus on the role of vertical di¤erences between candidates
(competence), we assumed away the possibility that candidates have policy biases. It may
be interesting to relax this assumption. In such a case, there may be an e¤ect in which
proposing a platform that is opposite to a candidates policy bias serves as a stronger signal
about his competence. This type of extension needs to enlarge the policy space to the
standard continuum policy space. In such an extension, however, the number of possible
combinations of policy announcements becomes large and it is necessary to construct a large
number of equilibrium beliefs, contingent on policy choices. This is a very di¢ cult task that
requires some simplifying assumptions about the way a voters beliefs are formed. For the
same reason, extending our model to a continuum of state space is also left to future research.
5 Appendix A: Proofs
5.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Suppose that the playersstrategies are as follows: v (0; 1) = v (0; 1) = ; v (1; 1) = 1=2,
g (0) = 1; g 1 ( 1) = g1 (1) = 1; g0 (0) = d; and g0 ( 1) = g0 (1) = (1  d) =2. We will show
that there are  2 [0; 1=2) and d 2 (0; 1) such that these strategies constitute an equilibrium,
if and only if m > 1=2 or c >  (m) for a function  that satises  (m) > 1=2. Note that
W ( 1) = W (1) > W (0) immediately follows from  < 1=2.
A strategy of type (C; 0) candidates, who are mixing, is optimal when U (1; 0) = U (0; 0) and
U ( 1; 0) = U (0; 0) : These can be rewritten as
G (; d; k) = U (1; 0)  U (0; 0) =

1
2
  

k + c  cd+    2c + 2cd   1 = 0: (5)
On the other hand, the voting strategy is optimal if and only if
P
2 ' (j1; 0) = 1=2 andP
2 ' (j   1; 0) =  1=2, since in such a case, candidates proposing 0 and  1 (and 0 and
16Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997) consider models in which candidates cannot
make commitments at all.
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1) are equally preferred. Thus we have
1 m
2
c (1  c)
1 m
2
c (1  c) +mc (1  c) 1 d
2
+mc2d
 
1 d
2
 = 1
2
;
which can be rewritten as
F (d) = mcd2 +m (1  2c) d+ (1  2m) (1  c) = 0: (6)
Because F (1) = 1
2
  1
2
c > 0; there is bd 2 (0; 1) such that F bd = 0 if mind2[0;1] F (d) < 0: A
su¢ cient condition is F (0) < 0; which is ensured when m > 1=2: On the other hand, if
m < 1=2; F (0) > 0 and argmind2R F (d) = 2c 12c : Hence if c  1=2; we have F (d) 
0 for all d 2 [0; 1] and we cannot nd such bd 2 (0; 1): Think of the case c > 1=2: Leted = argmind2R F (d) = argmind2(0;1) F (d) : If F ed < 0; there are two such bd 2 (0; 1): By
substituting ed = 2c 1
2c
; it is veried that F
ed < 0 as long as c is higher than a threshold
value determined by m: Take  (m) as the maximum of such a threshold and 1=2:
Let this value of bd be d (c;m) (if there are multiple such m; take the smaller one): In
order to complete the proof, it is enough to show that given k; there is   0 such that
G (; d (c;m) ; k) = 0: Since it is a strictly decreasing function of  and G (; d; k) < 0 for
all   1=2; this is possible if G (0; d (c;m) ; k) > 0; which holds if and only if k+2c 2
2c
>
d (c;m) : Hence it is an equilibrium if k > 2cd (c;m) + 2   2c. Since we assumed that
k > 2; this completes the proof. Q.E.D.
5.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Suppose that m < 1=2 and the players strategies are as follows: v (0; 1) = v (0; 1) =
; v (1; 1) = 1=2, g (0) = 1; g 1 ( 1) = g1 (1) = 1; g0 ( 1) = g0 (1) = 1=2; and g ( 1) =
g (1) = (1  d) =2, and g (0) = d: We will show that we can nd  2 (0; 1=2) and d 2
(0; 1) such that those strategies constitute an equilibrium if and only if m < 1=2 and c <
1
2(1 m) . Note that W ( 1) = W (1) > W (0) immediately follows from  < 1=2.
In order to be an equilibrium, E[U ( 1; )] = E[U (0; )] and E[U (1; )] = E[U (0; )],
because all the platforms should be equally preferred. Hence we have a condition
G (; d; k) = E[U (1; )]  E[U (0; )] = 0: (7)
Also, it must hold that
P
2 ' (j1; 0) = 1=2 and
P
2 ' (j   1; 0) =  1=2: Those can
be rewritten as
1 m
2
[c (1  c) + (1  c)2 1 d
2
]  1 m
2
(1  c)2  1 d
2

1 m
2

c (1  c) + (1  c)2 1 d
2

+m

c (1  c) 1
2
+ (1  c)2  1 d
2

+ 1 m
2
(1  c)2  1 d
2
 = 1
2
;
which can be simplied as
F (d) = 2c+ d  2cm  cd  1 = 0: (8)
The solution bd is given by bd = 1 2c+2cm
1 c and hence
bd 2 (0; 1) if m < 1
2
and c < 1
2(1 m) :
Therefore, in order to prove the theorem, it is enough to show that given k; equation (7), as
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a function of ; has a solution in (0; 1=2) when d = bd: It can be seen that G (; d; k) < 0 for
all   1=2; d; and k: Let  be the value of k that satises G

0; bd;  = 0: Since G (0; d; k) is
a strictly increasing function of k; we can nd such : Then it follows that when k > ; we
can nd  such that G

; bd; k = 0 from (0; 1=2). Since
G (0; d; k) = E[U (1; )]  E[U (0; )] (9)
=
1
2
k +m[cd  d] + (1 m)
2

3
2
cd  2d  3
2
c  1
2
c2 +
1
2
c2d

= 0;
it is easy to see that  < 2  2cm: Because we assumed that k > 2; this completes the proof.
Q.E.D.
5.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Let ' ( 1j   1; 0) = 1 and ' (1j1; 0) = 1: Then v ( 1; 0) = 1 and v (1; 0) = 1 follow, which
support the candidatesstrategy. Q.E.D.
5.4 Proof of Theorem 4
Suppose that the playersstrategies are as follows: v (0; 1) = v (0; 1) = ; v (1; 1) = 1=2,
g0 (0) = 1; g 1 ( 1) = g1 (1) = 1; and g ( 1) = g (1) = (1  d) =2.
For the voters strategy to be optimal, it has to be satised that
P
2 ' (j1; 0) =
1=2 and
P
2 ' (j   1; 0) =  1=2; and these are written as
 1 m
2
(1  c)2 d1 d
2
+ 1 m
2
[c (1  c) d+ (1  c)2 d1 d
2
]
1 m
2
(1  c)2 d1 d
2
+m[c (1  c) 1 d
2
+ (1  c)2 d1 d
2
] + 1 m
2
[c (1  c) d+ (1  c)2 d1 d
2
]
=
1
2
:
(10)
Because the right hand side is strictly increasing with d; and it is 0 when d = 0 and 1 when
d = 0; there is a unique ed 2 (0; 1) that satises the above equation.
On the other hand, it can be computed thatX
x2f 1;1g
X
2f 1;1g
[U (x; )  U (0; )] = 2
X
x2f 1;1g
[U (x; 0)  U (0; 0)] (11)
; and also there is a unique e 2 (0; 1=2) such that U (1; 0) U (0; 0) = U ( 1; 0) U (0; 0) =
0 when d = ed: For such combination of (e; ed); from (11), E[U (x; )] = E[U (0; )] = 0 and
U (x; 0) = U (0; 0) for all x 2 X: Hence candidatesstrategies are also optimal. This completes
the proof. Q.E.D.
5.5 Proof of Theorem 5
In the following, denote by (g; g) the set of platforms that are chosen with strictly positive
probabilities, i.e., (g; g) = fxjmaxfg (x) ;
P
 g (x)g > 0g: Note that (g; g) = X does
not necessarily imply that there is no o¤-equilibrium platform choices, because candidates
choices are correlated with each other. Furthermore, denote by P (x) the set of types of
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candidates who choose a particular platform with a strictly positive probability, that is,
(C; ) 2 P (x) if g (x) > 0 and I 2 P (x) if g (x) > 0:
Note that for x 2 f 1; 1g; U (x; )  U (0; ) =
Pr[y 6=  xj]fv (x; 0)  1=2gk + Pr[y =  x]fv (x; y)  v (0; y)gk (12)
+
X
s2X
Pr[y = sj]fv (x; s)u (x; ) + v (s; x)u (s; )g
 
X
s2X
Pr[y = sj]fv (0; s)u (0; ) + v (s; 0)u (s; )g;
and E[U ( 1; )]  E[U (0; )] =
Pr[y 6=  xj]fv (x; 0)  1=2gk + Pr[y =  x]fv (x; y)  v (0; y)gk (13)
+E
"X
s2X
Pr[y = sj]fv (x; s)u (x; ) + v (s; x)u (s; )g
#
 E
"X
s2X
Pr[y = sj]fv (0; s)u (0; ) + v (s; 0)u (s; )g
#
;
where Pr[y = sj] = cg (s) + (1  c) g (s) ; which is the probability that a candidate chooses
platform s when the state is :
Then we have the following three lemmata.
Lemma 1 In an anonymous and symmetric equilibrium such that (g; g) = X; g 1 ( 1) =
1 and g1 (1) = 1:
Proof. Take an equilibrium such that (g; g) = X: We rst demonstrate that g 1 (0) =
0 holds (g1 (0) = 0 is also proven in an analogous way). In order to accomplish this, suppose
that g 1 (0) > 0; which implies U ( 1; 1)  U (0; 1) : In order for this to hold, however,
from (12), we must have v ( 1; 0) < 1: Then from (12), U ( 1; 0) < U (0; 0) and U ( 1; 1) <
U (0; 1) follow. These also imply E[U ( 1; )] < E[U (0; )]: Therefore, we have f(C; 1)g =
P ( 1) and hence P2' (j   1; 0) = 1: Then, however, v ( 1; 0) = 1 follows, which is a
contradiction. Similarly, we can also prove that g1 (0) = 0 holds.
Next, suppose that g 1 (1) > 0 holds. Because in a symmetric equilibrium, for all g and
g; it can be computed that U (1; 1)   U ( 1; 1) > U (1; 0)   U ( 1; 0) > U (1; 1)  
U ( 1; 1) follows, and hence we have E[U (1; )] > E[U ( 1; )]. Then we have f(C; 1)g =
P ( 1) and hence P2' (j   1; 0) = 1: From these, however, v ( 1; 0) = 1 follows, which
is a contradiction.
Lemma 2 In an anonymous and symmetric equilibrium such that (g; g) = X; if g0 (0) 2
(0; 1) then g (0) = 1: Also, if g0 (0) = 1 then g (0) 2 (0; 1):
Proof. Dene the following functions:
 (v; g; g) = (1  2v (0; 1))k   2v (0; 1) ;
 (v; g; g) = (1  v (0; 1)  v (0; 1)) k + v (0; 1) + v (0; 1)  2;
 (v; g; g) = (1  2v (0; 1)) k   2v (0; 1) :
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In a symmetric equilibrium, we have g 1 ( 1) = g1 (1) ; and by using this it can be computed
that
 (v; g; g) =
1
2
X
2f 1;1g
X
x2f 1;1g
fU (x; )  U (0; )g
= (1  c) fg ( 1) (v; g; g) + g (0)  (v; g; g) + g (1)  (v; g; g)g+ c (v; g; g)
and
 (v; g; g) =
X
x2f 1;1g
fU (x; 0)  U (0; 0)g
= (1  c) fg ( 1) (v; g; g) + g (0)  (v; g; g) + g (1)  (v; g; g)g
+cfg0 ( 1) (v; g; g) + g0 (0)  (v; g; g) + g0 (1)  (v; g; g)g:
In order to obtain a contradiction, suppose that there is an equilibrium such that g0 (0) 2
(0; 1) and g (0) 2 (0; 1): Observe that g0 (0) > 0 and g (0) > 0 imply  (v; g; g)  0 and
 (v; g; g)  0: If minf (v; g; g) ;  (v; g; g)g > 0; then from  (v; g; g)  0 we must
have  (v; g; g) < 0: However, then  (v; g; g) <  (v; g; g) follows and hence we have
E
hP
x2f 1;1gfU (x; )  U (0; )g
i
>
P
x2f 1;1gfU (x; 0)   U (0; 0)g; which induces g (0) =
0; a contradiction . Also, if maxf (v; g; g) ;  (v; g; g)g < 0; we must have  (v; g; g) >
0: Then it follows that  (v; g; g) >  (v; g; g) and hence we must have either E[U ( 1; )] >
E[U (0; )] or E[U (1; )] > E[U (0; )]; and hence g (0) = 0; a contradiction. If  (v; g; g) =
 (v; g; g) = 0; we must have  (v; g; g) = 0; but it can be checked that there is no v such
that these are simultaneously satised. Finally, suppose that  (v; g; g) > 0 and  (v; g; g) <
0: Then, we must have g0 (1) (v; g; g) + g0 ( 1)  (v; g; g) = 0; since otherwise, we have
either  (v; g; g) >  (v; g; g) or  (v; g; g) <  (v; g; g) each leads a contradiction. This
also implies  (v; g; g) = 0; since otherwise we have g (0) = 1 or g (1) = 0: Then, it must also
hold that g (1) (v; g; g)+ g ( 1)  (v; g; g) = 0; and hence g0 (1) =g0 ( 1) = g (1) =g ( 1) =
1: Now we have  (v; g; g)+ (v; g; g) = 0; from which (1 v (0; 1) v (0; 1))k v (0; 1) 
v (0; 1) = 0 follows. This, however, contradicts  (v; g; g) = 0: Hence there is no equilibrium
such that g0 (0) 2 (0; 1) and g (0) 2 (0; 1).
Next, suppose g0 (0) = g (0) = 1: Then, it follows that
P
2 ' (j   1; 0) =  1; and
hence v ( 1; 0) = 1: Then U ( 1; 0)  U (0; 0) implies k  2; which is a contradiction.
Finally, suppose that 1 > g0 (0) > 0: In a symmetric equilibrium, it must hold that g0 (1) =
g0 ( 1) ; because otherwise
P
2 ' (j   1; 0)
 6= P2 ' (j1; 0) follows, which leads a
contradiction. Then we must have  (v; g; g) = 0 and v (0; 1) < 1=2 from k > 2: Those
imply  (v; g; g) >  (v; g; g) and hence  (v; g; g) < 0: This implies  (v; g; g) < 0; and
thus g (0) = 1 follows.
Lemma 3 In an anonymous and symmetric equilibrium such that (g; g) = X, g0 ( 1) =
g0 (1) :
Proof. Suppose that g0 ( 1) 6= g0 (1) : Then, from Lemma 2, g (0) = 1 follows. Now because
it holds that
P
2 ' (j   1; 0)
 6= P2 ' (j1; 0), we have v ( 1; 0) 6= v (1; 0) : Suppose
v ( 1; 0) > v (1; 0) ; without loss of generality. Then, U ( 1; 0) > U (1; 0) follows and hence
we have f(C; 1)g = P (1) : This impliesP2 ' (j1; 0) = 1 and thus v (1; 0) = 0; which is a
contradiction.
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Those lemmata show that in any anonymous and symmetric equilibrium such that every
platform may be chosen, candidatesstrategies are one of those characterized in Section 3.
Then, Theorem 5 follows from this fact and the discussion in Appendix B. Q.E.D.
5.6 Appendix B: Equilibrium Renement
In this appendix, we discuss renement issues. Towards this end, we apply the D1 renement,
proposed by Cho and Kreps (1987). In our context, it requires that the voter does not
attribute a deviation to a particular type of candidate if there is some other type who is
willing to make the deviation for a strictly larger set of possible voting strategies.
In our model, however, a simple application of the D1 criterion is not appropriate, because
there are rst movers (candidates) whose strategies are strongly correlated with the state.
This makes it impossible to make an inference about a deviating players type (which must
have some implication about the state) independently from the action of a non-deviating
player. Therefore, we modify the usual D1 criterion by applying the idea used in Bagwell
and Ramey (1991). It uses the fact that the types of the two candidates are strongly correlated
and that the types of the candidates are also correlated with the state. For example, it is
not possible that the voter perceives a candidatetype to be (C; 1) at the same time as she
perceives another candidates type to be type (C; 0): Once we require that after one candidate
deviates the voter should still believe that another candidate follows the equilibrium strategy,
this property of correlated types should impose some conditions on o¤-equilibrium beliefs.17
As in before, given an equilibrium (g; g; v; ') ; let (g; g) be the set of platforms that are
chosen with strictly positive probabilities. Also, denote by P (x) the set of types of candidates
that choose a particular platform with a strictly positive probability. Finally, let V (t) be the
equilibrium payo¤ for type t candidates in equilibrium (g; g; v; ') ; which is dened by (1)
for competent candidates and (2) for incompetent candidates.
Next, given an equilibrium (g; g; v; '); for each pair of type t 2 T and an o¤-equilibrium
platform choice p =2 (g; g) let Dt (p) and D+t (p) be sets of functions from X  X to
[0; 1] that are dened, respectively, as follows:
Dt (p) = fv0 : U (p; )  V (t)g if t = (C; )
= fv0 : E[U (p; )]  V (t)g if t = I:
D+t (p) = fv0 : U (p; ) > V (t)g if t = (C; )
= fv0 : E[U (p; )] > V (t)g if t = I;
where U (p; ) is calculated by (1) with voting rule v0 and candidatesstrategies g and g of
the equilibrium. Note that these sets can be empty.
The above denitions say that, Dt (p) is the set of voting rules that make type t candidates
weakly prefer to deviate to the o¤-equilibrium platform p; when the voters belief and voting
strategy satisfy the particular restriction and the opponent is supposed to follow the equilib-
rium strategy (g; g) : Similarly, D+t (p) is dened with strict preferences. An equilibrium that
17Bagwell and Ramey (1991) construct a two-period oligopoly model in which the incumbents pricing
choices, which may signal their production costs, are followed by the entrants entering decision. In their
renement of what they call unprejudiced beliefs, the entrant assumes a single deviation happens after the
o¤-equilibrium choices of incumbents.
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satises the D1 criterion is the equilibrium satisfying the following condition, in addition to
the conditions for a Bayes-Nash equilibrium:
Denition 1 An equilibrium (g; g; v; ') satises D1 if for all pairs of x and y such that
x 2 (g; g) ; y =2 (g; g) ; the following are satised:
Condition 1: If I 2 P (x) and there is (C; ) such that Dt0 (y)  D+(C;) (y) for all t0 6=
(C; ); then ' (yjx; y) = 1:
Condition 2: If I =2 P (x) and there is (C; ) 2 P (x) such that DI (y)  D+(C;) (y) and
D(C;0) (y)  D+(C;) (y) for all (C; 0) 2 P (x) ; then ' (yjx; y) = 1: If there is no such
(C; ); then X
2
' (jx; y) 2 int cofjD(C;) (y) =2 D+t (y) for all t 2 P (x)g:
In above denitition, int coA means the interior of the convex hull of set A:Condition 1
describes the case in which the voter knows that the non-deviator may be incompetent and
hence cannot elicit any information from him. In this case, the voter attributes a deviation
to a particular type, if that type is the most likely to deviate among all types. Condition
2 describes the case in which the voter knows that the non-deviator is competent In this
case, the voter can ignore the possibility that the deviating candidate is a competent type
who does not choose the platform that the non-deviator is choosing, because two candidates
cannot be di¤erent competent types. Then, she attributes a deviation to the type who has the
strongest incentive among all possible types of deviator. Also, even if she cannot attribute
a deviation to a single competent type, she still uses information obtained from the non-
deviating candidate to update her belief. We have no restriction on o¤-equilibrium beliefs
when incompetent candidates are not excluded from the possibility of being the deviator,
because the voter is free to think that the deviator should be incompetent, in which case his
deviation reveals nothing about the state.
Now we have the following lemma, which completes the proof of Theorem 5.
Lemma 4 Any equilibrium such that f 1; 1g ( (g; g) fails D1. Also, the equilibria char-
acterized in Theorem 1 through Theorem 4 satisfy D1.
Proof. We rst show that there is no equilibrium that satises D1 and (g; g) is singleton.
Towards this end, suppose that such an equilibrium exists. First think of the case in which
(g; g) = f1g: Because whether a particular v is included in Dt ( 1) or D+t ( 1) depends
only on v ( 1; 1) ; we can easily see that
Dt ( 1)  D+(C; 1) ( 1) for all t 2 fI; (C; 1); (C; 0)g:
Then, D1 implies that if the voter observes platform pair ( 1; 1); her o¤-equilibrium belief
puts the whole mass on the event that the deviating candidate is type (C; 1). Then, however,
it must hold that v ( 1; 1) = 1. This implies that type (C; 1) candidates have an incentive
to deviate to 0; which is a contradiction. The same proof applies to the cases in which
(g; g) = f 1g and (g; g) = f0g:
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Next, we show that there is no equilibrium that satises D1 such that (g; g) = f0; 1g or
(g; g) = f0; 1g: Towards this end, take an equilibrium such that (g; g) = f0; 1g: By
using g ( 1) = g ( 1) = 0 for all  and (1) we can show that g 1 (0) = 1: To see this, if
g 1 (0) < 1; it must hold that U (1; 1)   U (0; 1)  0; which implies
 
v (0; 1)  1
2

k +
3v (0; 1)  0: This in turn implies that both U (1; 0)  U (0; 0) > 0 and U (1; 1)  U (0; 1) >
0 hold, and thus E[U (0; )] > E[U (1; )]: Then only type (C; 1) candidates choose 0; and
hence v (0; 1) = 1; which contradicts U (1; 1) U (0; 1)  0: Hence, g 1 (0) = 1. Similarly,
we can show that g1 (1) = 1: Moreover, we have g0 (0) > 0; since otherwise
P
2' (; 0; 1) <
1=2 and v (0; 1) = 1; which is a contradiction. Also, it can be shown that v (1; 0) > 1=2; since
otherwise, we must have U (0; 0) U (1; 0) > 0 and E[U (0; )] E[U (1; )]  0; which imply
g0 (0) = 1 and g (0) = 1; respectively. This leads, however, to
P
2' (; 0; 1) = 1 and thereby
v (0; 1) = 1; which is a contradiction. Finally, g0 (0) > 0 and E[U (0; )]   E[U (1; )] >
U (0; 0)  U (1; 0) imply g (0) = 1:
We will show that
Dt ( 1)  D+(C; 1) ( 1) for all t 2 fI; (C; 0); (C; 1)g: (14)
Note that from (C; 1) =2 P (1) ; I =2 P (1) ; and D1, it must hold that v0 ( 1; 1) = 0: Then
whether v0 2 D+(C; 1) ( 1) or not depends only on whether v0 ( 1; 0) is strictly larger than
some threshold value or not. More precisely, v0 2 D+(C; 1) ( 1) if and only if
v0 ( 1; 0) k   (1  v0 ( 1; 0)) > 1
2
k   1: (15)
It is easy to see that (15) is a necessary condition for v0 2 Dt (t) ; from which (14) follows.
It is straightforward to prove the second statement and hence the proof is omitted.
The above result, however, is not powerful enough to enable us to discuss under what
parameter values we can justify the equilibrium of Theorem 3. One possible idea is to simply
assume that the voter updates her belief about the state of the world based only on the choice
made by the other candidate, when D1 is of no bite. This argument seems compelling, given
that candidatestypes are independent from other.
Denition 2 Take a pair of platforms x 2 (g; g) ; y =2 (g; g) such that for all t 6=
I; DI (y)  Dt (y) : Then the voter uses simple o¤-equilibrium updating if
' (jx; y) = f () (cg (x) + (1  c) g (x))P
 f () (cg (x) + (1  c) g (x))
:
Then, we can see easily the following result, which provides some argument for supporting
the equilibrium of Theorem 3 only for the parameter range of c  1=2 (1 m) :
Proposition 2 The equilibrium of Theorem 3 is supported by simple o¤-equilibrium updating
if and only if c  1=2 (1 m) :
Proof. Given the candidates strategies in Theorem 3, there is v such that v ( 1; 0) =
v (1; 0) < 1=2 and v ( 1; 1) = 1=2 and that satises v 2 DI (y) and v =2 Dt (y) for all
t 6= I: The formula of simple o¤-equilibrium updating implies ' (j   1; 0) <  1=2 and
' (j1; 0) > 1=2; if and only if c  1=2 (1 m) :
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